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I. INTRODUCTION

The year 1994 saw the conclusion of a very important trilateral trade
and investment treaty in North America: the North American Free Trade
Agreement.' Since then, this agreement has had a tremendous impact on
the trading relations among the three signatory states-the United States,
Canada, and Mexico.2 Of particular significance is Chapter 11, the
Investment Chapter. One of the main objectives of Chapter 11 is to
provide an effective means for the resolution of disputes between a
foreign investor and the host government.3 To this end, it provides a
mechanism whereby private parties can initiate arbitration proceedings
against the host state before an international tribunal 4 such as, for
example, the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes, commonly referred to as ICSID. 5

1. North America Free Trade Agreement, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1994) [hereinafter NAFTA].
2. Hereinafter, the United States, Canada, and Mexico are referred to as "Parties."
3. NAFTA, supra note 1. According to the Preamble of NAFTA, the Parties
undertook to "[ensure] a predictable commercial framework for business planning and
investment.. . in a manner consistent with environmental protection and conservation... and
promot[ion of] sustainable development." Article 102 (1)(e) states that the objective of
the Agreement is to "create effective procedures for the implementation and application
of this Agreement, for its joint resolution and for the resolution of disputes..." North
American Free Trade Agreements, Dec. 8, 1992, prmbl., art. 102(1)(e), reprinted in
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENTS, TREATY MATERIALS, at 2-3 (James R.
Holbein & Donald J. Musch eds., 1992).
4. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1116 (which permits investors to initiate
international arbitration against a host state for violations of the substantive investment
provisions in NAFTA). For an overview of the investor dispute settlement mechanism in
the NAFTA Investment Chapter, see Gary N. Horlick & Amanda DeBusk, Dispute
Resolution under NAFTA: Building on the US.-Canada FTA, GATT and ICSID, 10 J.
INT'L ARB. 51 (1993).
5. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of other States, March 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 4 I.L.M.
532 (1965) [hereinafter The ICSID Convention]. This is only one among three
permissible fora for arbitration of investment disputes permitted under the NAFTA
regime and is by way of illustration only.
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A. Overview of Chapter 11 Provisions
The substantive obligations of each NAFTA Party with respect to
investment arrangements are set out in Part A of Chapter 11.6 Part B of
Chapter 11 contains rules regarding the enforcement mechanism, such as
the forum for dispute settlement and the choice of procedural rules
governing the arbitral proceedings. 7 Article 11208 provides a choice
between three sets of arbitral rules to govern investment disputes that
9
arise under Part A: the ICSID Convention and its rules; the ICSID
10 and its rules" (in the event the parties choose
(Additional Facility)
institutional arbitration; or, in case the parties choose ad hoc arbitration,
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL)
Arbitration Rules.12
B. Background ofDebate on Chapter11
Chapter 11 of NAFTA represents a significant shift in Mexico's
approach to foreign investment, which had until then followed a policy
of economic protectionism. 13 It is also the first time that two developed
6. Section A contains provisions dealing with the scope of application of Chapter
11 and substantive obligations of the Parties in the investment context, such as national
treatment, most-favored-nation treatment, minimum standard of treatment, and compensation
in the context of expropriation. NAFTA, supra note 1, at arts. 1101- 14.
7. For a detailed description of the dispute resolution mechanism envisaged in
Chapter 11 B, see Gary N. Horlick & Alicia L. Marti, NAFTA Chapter 11 B: A Private
Right ofAction to Enforce Market Access through Investments, 14 J. INT'L ARB. 43, 4548 (1997). For a practical overview of the relevant provisions of Chapter 11 B and the
three possible regimes of arbitral procedure permitted under NAFTA, see Cheri D.
Eklund, A Primeron the Arbitrationof NAFTA Chapter11 Investor-StateDisputes, 11 J.
INT'L ARB.135, 140-53 (1994).

8. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1120.
9. The ICSID Convention, supra note 5, at art. 44.
10. ICSID Additional Facility for the Administration of Conciliation, Arbitration,
and Fact-Finding Proceedings, Doc. ICSID/1 1 (June 1979) [hereinafter The Additional
Facility].
11. Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings
by the Secretariat of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
Schedule C-Arbitration Rules, Doc. ICSID/l 1 (June 1979) [hereinafter Additional
Facility Rules].
12. Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law, approved by the United Nations General Assembly on December 15, 1976, U.N.
GAOR, 31st Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 32, U.N. Doc. A/31/17 (1976) [hereinafter
Arbitration Rules].
13. Gloria L. Sandrino, The NAFTA Investment Chapter and Foreign Direct
Investment in Mexico: A Third World Perspective, 27 VA. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 259, 262

nations, namely Canada and the United States, have included such
provisions in an agreement among themselves. 14 Prior to NAFTA,
investor-state disputes usually consisted of investors from developed
countries making claims against host states that were developing nations.
The NAFTA experience, however, appears to have ushered a new and
perhaps unanticipated scenario with developed countries often in the role
of host nation. 15
No other provisions of NAFTA have been more hotly debated in
recent times than Chapter 11 and, in particular, Article 1110, which
addresses indirect expropriation. 16 This is due in large part to the
numerous investor claims filed against NAFTA host governments.
Beginning in 1999, there has been a steady flow of NAFTA investorstate disputes involving investments in the United States, while the trend
of U.S. investors seeking compensation from the other two Parties for
their investments in those host countries also continues. 17
There has been much suspicion and concern on the part of public
interest groups that the dispute resolution process, in particular the
resolution of claims of creeping expropriation, tends to short-change the
host state and is a weapon in the hands of corporate investors. 18 NAFTA
claimants voice the opposite concern-that the host states illegitimately
resort to their municipal courts to overturn pro-claimant arbitral awards,
despite the apparent conflict of interest.19
(1994). Prior to NAFTA, Mexico's approach to foreign investment was epitomized by
the Calvo doctrine, which was in direct opposition to prevailing international law
protecting the rights of foreign investors. Id. at 308.
14. Daniel M. Price, An Overview of the NAFTA Investment Chapter: Substantive
Rules andInvestor-State Dispute Settlement 27 INT'L LAW. 727, 731 (1993).
15. Guillermo Aguilar Alvarez & William W. Park, The New Face of Investment
Arbitration:NAFTA Chapter 11, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 365, 370 (2003).
16. NAFTA's investor-state provisions have generated much literature on their
structure and legitimacy. See, e.g., Charles H. Brower II, Structure, Legitimacy and
NAFTA 's Investment Chapter, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 37 (2003); Ari Afilalo,
Constitutionalization through the Back Door: A European Perspective on NAFTA 's
Investment Chapter,34 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 3 (2001).
17. Todd Weiler, Foreign Investment in the United States: The Dawning of a New
Era in NAFTA Investor-StateDispute Settlement, 34 INT'L LAW 405, 405-06 (2000).
18. For an appraisal of the various investor claims from an environmental
standpoint, see e.g. Stephen L. Kass & Jean M. McCarroll, NAFTA's Chapter 11:
Environmental Claims, 228 N.Y. L.J. 3, (col. 1) (2002).
19. One example of an arbitration award that was sought to be (and was) set aside
by a municipal court upon the complaint of a host government is the Metalcladdecision,
discussed infra. It evoked a visceral response among some scholars as overstepping the
bounds of municipal authority by "de facto extend[ing] the scope of its review by
importing some of the standards of review of decisions of domestic administrative
tribunals when dealing with... [t]he Arbitral Tribunal's finding of expropriation as a
result of the ecological decree." Hector Olasolo, Have the Public Interests been
Forgotten in NAFTA Chapter 11 Foreign Investor/Host State Arbitration? Some
Conclusionsfrom the Judgmentof the Supreme Court of British Columbia on the Case of
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C. Analytic Framework
Charles Brower describes the widely debated legitimacy question as
one partly stemming from textual indeterminacy. 20 The analytic
framework of this Comment however treats the question of textual
indeterminacy as distinct from the normative question of the legitimacy
of the tribunal and of the dispute resolution process as a whole, rather
than as a part of it. 2' Consequently, Part II explores the extent to which
the indeterminacy of the text in Article 1110 has been resolved through
arbitral decisions. It argues that as a practical matter, and contrary to
public perception, the approach of tribunals in resolving investor-state
disputes has been fairly even-handed and consistent. Article 1110 has been
chosen here as the analytic vehicle for exploring textual indeterminacy
because such provision has been the target of much criticism.
Normative concerns of legitimacy and transparency remain despite the
substantial resolution of the textual indeterminacy question. They
require critical evaluation at a level that transcends merely the fear of a
"bad" outcome, which is, depending on one's vantage point, one that is
perceived as unreasonably favoring investors' interests over the host
state's public interest concerns, or vice versa. These concerns are
addressed in Part III.
Part IV provides suggestions for future arbitral tribunals interpreting
the provision on indirect expropriation, bearing in mind its context
within NAFTA, as well as obligations under customary international law.
II.

THE ARTICLE 11 10 REGIME OF "TANTAMOUNT TO
NATIONALIZATION OR EXPROPRIATION"-

TEXTUAL INDETERMINACY?

Admittedly, the observations relating to one provision in the Investment
Chapter may not necessarily shed light on the more general question of
textual indeterminacy. Nonetheless, as suggested earlier, Article 1110 is
Mexico v. Metalclad, 8 L. & Bus. REV. AM. 189, 202 (2002).
20. Brower, supra note 16, at 59-60.
21. This approach is distinct from Professor Brower's approach, wherein he treats
textual indeterminacy as part of the larger problem of perceived legitimacy or
illegitimacy of, among other things, the tribunal, the scope of the claims made by
investors, and actions of host states in approaching municipal courts to set aside arbitral
awards. He states: "The root of the [illegitimacy] problem lies not in the purportedly
avaricious hearts of investors but in textual indeterminacy created by the NAFTA
Parties." Brower, supra note 16, at 62.

a good exemplar for examining the charge of textual indeterminacy and
the extent to which it has been resolved since NAFTA came into effect.
It is indicative of the approach of arbitral tribunals to interpretation of
NAFTA Investment Chapter provisions.
A. Backgroundof Article 1110
Article I 10 provides that a NAFTA Party shall not expropriate either
directly or indirectly an investment, nor shall it take a measure
"tantamount to nationalization or expropriation," unless it is done for a
public purpose and on a non-discriminatory basis. 22 The latter part of
the Article appears to be designed to address the problem of creeping
expropriation.2 3 Negotiation of the Investment Chapter reveals that this
provision was primarily aimed at preventing illegal takings of United
States and Canadian businesses by the Mexican government. 24 This was
due to previous instances of seizure by Mexico of foreign-owned
companies.2 5 Ironically, this provision has been invoked in numerous
actions against the Canadian and United States governments. 26
From the numerous NAFTA investor-state arbitrations that have
unfolded, it emerges that claimants, usually multinational corporations,
have attempted to push the interpretive boundaries of the phrase
"tantamount to expropriation" to questionable limits, to the point where
any governmental action that threatens foreign investment unhesitatingly
becomes the subject of investor-state arbitration.27 Whether or not they
have been successful in doing so, thereby justifying the fears of many
critics, will be revealed in the analysis of some decisions of the tribunals.
B. The Concept of CreepingExpropriationin InternationalLaw
The concept of expropriation in and of itself is not new in international

22.

NAFTA, supranote l, atart. 1110.

23. Sandrino, supra note 13, at 308. She suggests that although NAFTA was
supposed to represent a reversal of the Calvo Doctrine in Mexico, which placed national
sovereignty above the rights of foreign investors, the Parties appear not to have
anticipated its use against host states other than Mexico, i.e., the United States and
Canada. Id.
24. Price, supra note 14, at 728.
25. For a discussion of the historical background of the international framework of
foreign direct investment, and in particular Mexico's role as the Third World protagonist
through its Calvo Doctrine, see generally, Sandrino, supra note 13. See also Matthew
Nolan and Darin Lippoldt, Obscure NAFTA Clause Empowers Private Parties:Investor
Protection Clause Lets Companies Haul Signatories into Arbitration for Violation of
Pact, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 6, 1998, at 32.
26. Alvarez & Park, supra note 15, at 368.
27. Nolan, supra note 25, at 34.
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law. 28 A successful claim of expropriation in international law generally
rests on the finding that a taking or deprivation of some legally
29
recognized right has been affected by the State party to the claim. The
principle that a forcible takeover of the premises of a forging investment
facility or the confiscation of personal property by government officials
would constitute an expropriatory taking can be elicited from the awards
of ICSID tribunals and the Hague Tribunal.30
While there is ample jurisprudence on direct expropriation, it is not
entirely clear as to what actions of the host government can be said to be
3
"tantamount to expropriation" or indirect expropriation. ' This becomes
problematic when one tries to interpret this phrase as it appears in Article
1110.32 Thus, while Article 113033 makes it clear that the substantive law

28.

RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 98

(1995).
29. Rudolf Dolzer, Indirect Expropriation of Alien Property, 1 ICSID REV.
FOREIGN INVESTMENT L. J. 41, 41 (1986), stating that the object of protection against
expropriation is essentially a property right. Such a right may be tangible or intangible,
such as contractual rights. Dolzer suggests that the law of expropriation in part defines
its scope through the definition of such property rights.
30. For a full discussion of expropriatory takings decisions by the Hague Tribunal
and ICSID tribunals, see John A. Westberg, Applicable Law, ExpropriatoryTakings and
Compensation in Cases of Expropriation:ICSID and Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal CaseLaw Compared, 8 ICSID REv.-FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 1, 10-15 (1993). After a
comprehensive review of awards by both the Hague Tribunal and the various ISCID
tribunals, he observes some principles emerge. For instance, he states that "the forcible
takeover of the premises of a foreign investment facility or the confiscation of personal
property, by military personnel or other government officials acting in an official
capacity for the government, constitutes takings which may be found to be expropriatoty
if the other elements of expropriatory conduct are found to be present." Id. at 13.
31. Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's
Investment Protectionsand the Misguided Questfor an International "Regulatory Takings"
Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 51 (2003).
32. Article 1110 states:
1. No Party shall directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment
of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation of such an investment ("expropriation"),
except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and the general principles of
treatment provided in Article 1105; and
(d) upon payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 to 6.
NAFTA, supra note 1.
33. Article 1131 states: "A Tribunal established under this Subchapter shall decide
the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of
international law." Id.

to be applied by the tribunal is the Agreement itself and the applicable
internationallaw, the latter is far from precise.34
Comeax and Kinsella explain creeping expropriation as one
"accomplished through a series of hostile actions that cumulatively
deprive the investor of the value of the investment." 35 The term "creeping"
is not a neutral term, 36 and "indirect expropriation" is preferable for the
purpose of this discussion. They state that such expropriatory actions of
the state deprive the investor of effective ownership of the asset, even
though the investor retains nominal ownership.37 Another author has
attempted to define in more general terms.38
Numerous governmental actions have been held to be compensable
acts of expropriation by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. 39 Indeed, the tribunal
frequently considered the issue of indirect expropriation.4 ° Some examples
34. Been and Beauvais caution that it is unclear whether the language in Article
1130 creates a new treaty specific standard, i.e., lex specialis, or is merely a reiteration of
existing customary international law. Been & Beauvais, supra note 32, at 51-52. As
later parts of this comment will discuss, some claimants have tried to make the argument
that it is indeed a lex specialis-an argument that the tribunal in S.D. Myers, Inc. v.
Canada rejected. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, Partial Award, 286.
35.

PAUL E.

COMEAUX

&

N. STEPHAN

KINSELLA,

INVESTMENT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL ASPECTS OF

PROTECTING

FOREIGN

POLITICAL RISK 8 (1996).

36. See Dolzer, supra note 29, at 44.
37. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 28, at 99: "[T]o the investor, the line of
demarcation between measures for which no compensation is due and actions qualifying
as indirect expropriation may well make the difference between the burden to operate (or
abandon) a non-profitable enterprise and the right to receive full compensation...."
38. Sandrino describes creeping expropriation as "involving measures whereby the
government increasingly imposes restrictions and controls such as excessive and
repetitive tax regulatory measures on the foreign investment enterprises so as to make it
difficult to continue in business at a profit. This leads to the sale or abandonment of the
project to the government or local private investors, thus having a net confiscatory
effect." Sandrino, supra note 13, at 317.
39. CHARLES N. BROWER & JASON D. BRUESCHKE, THE IRAN-UNITED STATES
CLAIMS TRIBUNAL 669 (1998) (noting that the tribunal has contributed a significant
amount of precedent that have influenced the shaping of international legal principles).
40. Charles N. Brower, Current Developments in the Law of Expropriation and
Compensation: A PreliminarySurvey of Awards of the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 21
INT'L LAW. 639, 643 (1987). After reviewing several of the awards issued by the
Tribunal, he states that it has been fairly consistent in its treatment of expropriation
claims. His conclusion on the pattern of expropriation findings by the Tribunal is as
follows:
A taking will be found to occur whenever actions attributable to the
Government amount to an unreasonable interference with the owner's use or
control of the property. The reasonableness of the interference is generally
determined pragmatically, focusing on the owner's rights to management and
income. A finding of attributability generally requires at least one deliberate
governmental assertion of control over the corporation, such as the substitution
of Government-appointed managers. Losses caused by revolutionary unrest
not directly traceable to such a governmental action have not generally been
held to constitute compensable expropriations.
Id. at 669.
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include incremental increases in taxes, increasingly harsh regulations,
import and export restrictions, price controls, zoning laws, prolonged
4
"temporary seizures" of assets, and control on expatriation of profits. '
The Iran-U.S. claims tribunal in Starrett Housing Corp. v. Republic of
Iran found that for an expropriation to occur, host state interference must
be to the extent that the property rights are rendered so useless that they
must be deemed to have been expropriated:
Measures taken by a state can interfere with property rights to such an extent
that these rights are rendered so useless that they must be deemed to have been
expropriated, even though the state does not purport to have expropriated them
42
and the legal titles to the property formally remains with the original owner.

Subsequent tribunals, in examining the question of whether a taking
constitutes an indirect expropriation, have followed the test laid down in
this case. The test places emphasis on the effect on the investor's rights
in making the determination.4 3
Indirect expropriation was also used by the government of Communist
China in the form of "hostage capitalism." 44 The Chinese government
adopted a two-stage approach. In the first phase, it would impose price
controls, tax increases, and wage increases on foreign investors while
imposing ceilings on funds flowing out of China; in the second phase,
the Chinese government would then prohibit the investors from closing
operations without their express approval, even though the investors
were losing money.45 Increasing liabilities would force the foreign parent
to remit money to the Chinese subsidiary.4 6
While these cases and scenarios illustrate governmental actions that
have been held to amount to indirect expropriation, no rule of customary
international law emerges.47 Rudolf Dolzer, after comprehensively
reviewing state practice and opiniojurisof nations on indirect expropriation,
concludes that the law of indirect expropriation is "sketchy and rough"
and that it is an area where "large lacunae remain. '' 48 Investment treaties,
41. COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 35, at 8.
42. Starett Housing Corp. v. Republic of Iran, Interlocutory Order, 4 Iran-U.S. Cl.
Trib. Rep. 122, 154 (1983).
43. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 28, at 100.
44. Pat. K. Chew, Political Risk and U.S. Investments in China: Chimera of
Protectionand Predictability?,34 VA. J. INT'L L. 615,627 (1994).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47.

IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1991).

48.

Dolzer, supra note 29, at 59.

including NAFTA, do not lay down any precise definitions for indirect
expropriation., although they refer to it as a compensable act. Nor do
any general principles 49 exist across domestic legal systems regarding
indirect expropriation. Each legal system has a different approach to
indirect expropriation depending on its constitutional limitations and
broad economic policy. Thus, there appears to be little guidance in the
form of rules for arbitral tribunals deciding claims of indirect expropriation.
This only underscores the need for and importance of well-reasoned
arbitral decisions in every investment dispute in which the issue arises. 5'
C. Regulation: Breach of a Commercial Contractor
Expropriation?
The problem arising from a lack of clear authority on the law of
indirect expropriation is further compounded by the fact that an act of
indirect expropriation may be factually difficult to distinguish from one
of lawful regulation,
and indeed from 'ordinary' breach of contract by
52
the sovereign.
The distinction is crucial, however, because as the
discussion below reveals, each type of governmental action leads to
dramatically different legal consequences.53
Every nation has the sovereign right to regulate certain activities of
private individuals and entities in the public interest. 54 Such regulations
are characteristic of governments of modem states and, in municipal
legal systems, are by and large not viewed as compensable incursions of
individuals' property rights.55 Many government regulations in some
way or another negatively impact a particular economic interest and
affect business opportunities for some; but unless it is confiscatory in
nature, it will not give rise to liability of the government as an action
constituting a compensable taking. 6 Instead, it is considered to be a
lawful exercise of 'police power' or eminent domain of the state, without
49. BROWNLIE, supra note 47, at 19.
50. The diversity of doctrinal approach is well explained through illustration by
Dolzer, supra note 29, at 59.
51. Arbitral awards generally bind only the parties to the dispute and have no
precedential value for subsequent tribunals. The NAFTA regime is no exception. Art.
1131(1) explicitly states: "An award made by a Tribunal shall have no binding force
except between the disputing parties and in respect of the particular case." NAFTA,
supra note 1. It is not uncommon at all, however, for investment tribunals to peek at the
factual and legal reasoning in prior awards as persuasive authority.
52. Richard C. Levin & Susan Erickson Marin, NAFTA Chapter 11: Investment
and Investment Disputes, 2 NAFTA L. & Bus. REv. 82, 97 (1996).
53. Id.
54. Dolzer, supra note 29, at 41.
55. Id.
56.

STATES

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

§ 712 cmt. g (1986).
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state cannot effectively carry out its function of distributive
which the
57
justice.
This is particularly important in the context of environmental regulations
in many countries, including NAFTA Parties.5 8 While the definitional
expanse may differ from country to country,5 9 the underlying policy
basis of these environmental regulations appear to be the same-that the
need to protect and preserve the environment for the present and future
generations outweighs the need to preserve the liberty of corporations to
freely carry on business at a profit.
Further, a state is not "responsible" 6 ° in international law for the
repudiation of a commercial contract-at least, where a state raises a
genuine dispute as to its legal obligations under the contract. 61 This may
happen when an investor defaults in performance, thereby compelling
the government to abandon the contract. 6 2 The key to distinguishing
between an expropriatory act and a commercial breach of contract
therefore is the role of the government at the time of the allegedly
unlawful action. If the government was acting as a sovereign rather than
as a commercial participant, the act is far less likely to be characterized
In the United States, the Restatement on Foreign
as expropriatory.
Relations Law is unequivocal in its separate treatment of expropriation
and breach of contract. 64 It states:
57. For a discussion of the state's interest in regulating the environment and
implications for expropriation claims, see Charles N. Brower, The Implications of National
and International Environmental Obligations for Foreign Investment Protection
Standards, Including Valuation: A Report from the Front Lines, in INTERNATIONAL
INvESTMENTS AND PROTECTION OF THE ENViRONMENT: THE ROLE OF DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
MECHANISMS 19, 20-28 (International Bureau of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ed.,

2000).
58.
59.

Id.
Julie Soloway, NAFTA "sChapter 11-The Challenge of PrivatePartyParticipation,

16 J. INT'L ARB. 8 (1999).

The author compares the Canadian and U.S. approach to

defining property rights and the police power of the state and observes that while in the
Canadian context one sees an expansive approach to the scope of the state's police
power, that is not so in the United States. Id. at 8-9. Also, property rights are not
enshrined in the Canadian Constitution, unlike in the United States Constitution. This
doctrinal divergence at the domestic level compounds the interpretive difficulty facing
NAFTA tribunals, given the sparse international law on the point. See supra Part II B.
60. The phrase is used in the sense of state responsibility for economic injury in
international law.

61. See generally Mann, State Contracts and State Responsibility, 54 AM. J. INT'L.
L. 572 (1960).
62. Id.
63. Levin & Marin, supra note 52, at 98.
64. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED

409

A state is responsible for economic injury resulting from breach of contract to
an alien under international law only where such breach is discriminatory or
occasioned by non-commercial considerations, and also in situations where the
alien is not 6 given
an adequate forum for seeking relief or not duly
y
compensated.

In the confines of a theoretical paradigm, an attempt to distinguish
each of the above may appear relatively straightforward. In practice
however, characterizing an action in a given set of facts as one of
regulation, breach of commercial contract, or indirect expropriation is
far from easy. Yet, each type of action leads to a totally different
consequence in law with respect to the duty of the host state to
compensate for the resultant economic injury.
The result as far as the NAFTA experience is concerned has been a
barrage of investor claims, based on innovative arguments that characterize
a measure of the host state as being tantamount to expropriation.6 6
Arguably, in many of the claims filed by investors before the ICSID
tribunals, the phrase "tantamount to expropriation" has been extended
beyond its intended limits and applied to varied situations of economic
loss resulting from governmental regulation. 67 Each claim points to a
mix of alleged interference with property rights and resulting substantial
economic effects on the claimant's property. 68 In Loewen v. United
States, for example, a judicial award was challenged as an expropriatory
act. 69 The claim by an investor before an arbitral tribunal that an award
of a domestic judicial body was expropriatory was quite startling as a
development in international law and perhaps stretched Chapter 11
beyond conventional notions of indirect expropriation. 70 No rational
distinction was made between a lawful sovereign act of regulation and
7
one of expropriation, especially in the context of environmental measures. '
Regardless of the eventual success or failure of the claim in the
arbitration, such indiscriminate labeling of governmental action represents
an alarming trend that requires, and indeed has generated, much public
STATES § 712 (1986).
65. Id.
66. See discussion in Part III.
67. This will be explored further in later sections.
68. Id.
69. Loewen v. United States, Statement of Claim, 62, 69-70. (Oct. 30, 1998). The
award ultimately dismissed the Canadian corporation's Chapter 11 challenge to the $500
million jury verdict for what was essentially a breach of contract claim. Loewen v.
United States, ICSID (W. Bank) Case No. ARB (AF)/98/3 (2003), award of June 26,
2003, availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/22094.pdf.
70. Arguably, it is the possibility to make such creative claims before an arbitration
panel that makes NAFTA and other bilateral investment treaties attractive as a forum for
investors. Mark Friedman and Gaeten Verhoosel, Arbitrating over BIT Claims 26
NAT'L L.J. 15 (2003)
71. Nolan and Lippoldt, supra note 25, at B8.
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debate. Some argue the trend suggests that corporate entities place
commercial interests over public health and welfare, including environmental
concerns, 72 and look upon Chapter 11 proceedings as a possible means
to shift responsibility away from themselves and onto the host state.7 3
The question of whether these criticisms are justified requires an
examination of how the arbitral tribunals have addressed claims of
indirect expropriation in the NAFTA context.
D. Jurisprudencefrom Chapter 11-based TribunalDecisions
While a number of investor claims have been filed under Chapter 11
in the last few years, many have reached settlement before a final award
was rendered. 74 The rules do not provide for a deadline for the tribunal
to reach a decision, as a result, arbitration proceedings before the ICSID
tend to be long-drawn.75 While some of these awards have addressed the
issue of interpreting "tantamount to expropriation," there has not been
much jurisprudential inquiry-which is somewhat understandable given
the nature of arbitral tribunals and their inability to create binding
precedent. The findings have turned largely on the facts of each case, as
76
one might consider proper in the arena of commercial arbitration.
There are, however, a number of observations made by arbitration panels
that are worth taking into account in order to understand the interpretive
trend of the Chapter 11 awards. 77 The following discussion considers
light on the "tantamount to expropriation"
some of the cases that shed
8
language in Article 1110.7

See, e.g., Howard Mann, Protecting Investor Rights and the Public Good:
72.
Assessing NAFTA's Chapter 11, Paper prepared for 2002 Conference on NAFTA
Chapter 11 at the Institute for International Economics in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 11,
2002), available at http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/graham0502.pdf.
73. Nolan and Lippoldt, supra note 25, at B8.
74. For a summary of NAFTA awards to date, as well as information on pending
and settled cases, see NAFTA Chapter 11 Investor-State Cases: Lessons for the Central
America Free Trade Agreement, Public Citizen (Feb. 2005), available at http://www.
wtowatch.org/library.cfn?refid=60391 (last visited Feb. 27, 2005).
75. Horlick & DeBusk, supra note 4, at 71.
76. There are of course serious questions as to whether a NAFTA investor-state
dispute can be likened to a private international commercial arbitration, given that the
dispute implicates other stakeholders and often triggers public policy concerns. For
more discussion, see Olasolo, supra note 19, at 195-96.
77. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1136 (provides that the tribunal's award has no
binding force except between the parties to the dispute. At the same time, arbitral tribunals
strive for consistency in results, despite the lack of any institutional obligation to that effect).
78. For a summary of recent developments in NAFTA investment disputes in

1. Robert Azinian v. Mexico7 9
The claimants in this case alleged that the Mexican government, by
canceling a concession contract awarded to the claimants for the
construction of a hazardous waste landfill, caused economic injury to the
claimant, which they alleged was in the nature of "loss of the value of
the concession contract as an on-going enterprise., 80 The claimants
argued that the repudiation of the contract amounted to an expropriation
of contractual rights, quoting Ian Brownlie's treatise Principlesof Public
InternationalLaw that an expropriation occurs "if the state exercises its
executive or legislative authority to destroy the contractual rights as an
asset." 81
The tribunal was categorical in its finding that NAFTA does not allow
investors to seek international arbitration for mere contractual breaches.8 2 It
held that phrases like "destroy contractual rights as an asset," which was
quoted by claimants' counsel, while serving as a description of extraordinary
breaches amounting to expropriation, do not indicate the basis of
distinction between expropriation and ordinary breach of contract.83 The
tribunal found that no act 'tantamount to expropriation' under Article
SI10 had occurred.
This was the first occasion for a Chapter 11 based ICSID Tribunal to
consider the difference between an act of indirect expropriation and one
of commercial breach of contract, thus taking it from a normative level
to a practical one applicable to the facts of a given case and offering
valuable guidance to future tribunals confronted with a similar issue.
84
2. Pope and Talbot Inc. v. Canada

The claimant in this case alleged breaches of five separate obligations
under Section A of Chapter 11 of NAFTA, including expropriation
under Article 1110.85
The impugned government action was the
Canadian government's Export Control Regime, which imposed various
limitations, including the reduction of the claimant's fee-free export
quota, allegedly resulting in the claimant suffering "injury to its business
general, see Todd Weiler, ForeignInvestment Law and the United States: You Can't Tell
the Players without a Scorecard,37 INT'L LAW. 279 (2003).
79. Azinian v. Mexico, Case No. ARB (AF)97/2, 14 ICSID REv. FOREIGN
INVESTMENT L. J. 538 (1999).

80.

Id. f28.

81.

Id. f88.
Id. f 87.

82.
83.
84.

Id. 190.
Interim Award rendered on June 26, 2000 [hereinafter Interim Award],

availableat http://www.naftaclaims.com.

85.

Id. ll.
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profitability. 8 6
operations, its expansion and management and its overall
On the question of expropriation, the claimant argued that Article
1110 creates a lex specialis in that it goes beyond the meaning of
expropriation in customary international law, comprehending a measure
beyond an outright taking or indirect expropriation. In other words they
urged that the term "tantamount" includes even non-discriminatory
measures of general application that have the effect of substantially
Parties.8 7
interfering with the investments of investors of NAFTA
The tribunal found that the investor's access to the United States
market was indeed an investment within the meaning of Article 1139
and therefore covered by Article 1110.88 It observed, however, that the

deciding factor for whether the Export Control Regime amounted to an
act tantamount to expropriation was the degree of interference by the
regulation.89
The exemption of a regulation from scrutiny for an expropriatory
element by a plea that it was within the "police power" of the host state
is thus not automatic and must stand the test of "degree." In this case,
the tribunal found that the interference was not substantial enough to be
characterized as expropriation.9" The sole "taking" that could be identified
by the investor was interference with its ability to carry on its business
of exporting softwood lumber to the United States, resulting in reduced
91
profits but not complete elimination of profits. There was no evidence
or suggestion of transfer of control or ownership to the Canadian
government. 92 The tribunal here appears to espouse the traditional
expropriation. 93
confiscation test that has been used in the past for direct
On the scope of "tantamount," the tribunal observed that it does not
expand the scope of indirect expropriation beyond the traditional
customary international law understanding of expropriation-it means
nothin more than 'equivalent to something' and cannot encompass
more. 9 This observation of the ICSID tribunal is significant to the
86.

Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Statement of Defense,

155-56 (NAFTA Ch. 11

Arb. Trib. Oct. 8, 1999), available at http://www.dfaitmaeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/
damage-award.pdf.

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. 150.
Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award, supra note 84, 96.
Id.
Id.
Id. 101.
Id.
Starrett,4 Iran-U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. at 154.
Azinian, supra note 79, 104. The tribunal noted that the French translation of

extent that it brought clarity to the meaning of "tantamount" in Article
1110 that had thus far been absent. The tribunal's position was that
"tantamount to expropriation" cannot take in more in its scope than
expropriation as understood in international law. This in effect means
that the standard of governmental conduct "tantamount to expropriation"
is no lower than the standard in customary international law. This
statement is not operationally helpful, however, because as discussed
earlier, there are no applicable norms in customary international law. At
the same time, taking the "degree of interference" test to be the guiding
principle, if future tribunals choose to adopt the Pope & Talbot line of
reasoning, it rules out the success of claims brought by corporations
based on loss of profits alone, without showing a sufficient degree of
interference from the host government. In fact, this approach was
followed in the Myers decision rendered in November 2000, discussed
below.
3. Myers v. Canada 9'
The Myers claim concerned an order of the Government of Canada
banning the export of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) from Canada. 96
The claimant's primary business was to carry PCB waste from Canada
to the United States for treatment of the waste to make it safe for
disposal.9 7 The claimant was a significant player in the Canadian market
for PCB waste disposal.9 8 There existed only one other significant
Canadian competitor. 99 The export ban allegedly caused the claimant
Myers to suffer various economic losses, ranging from loss of profits to
unfavorable tax consequences. 10 0 This formed the basis for the claim
under Article 1 10-that the ban was tantamount to expropriation. 1°1
The tribunal concluded that the order of the Canadian government was
not a measure tantamount to expropriation for the purposes of liability
under Article 1110.102 The primary basis for its decision was the temporary
nature of the ban in this case-a total of eighteen months, as the factual

the NAFTA uses a phrase that means 'equivalent.' Id.
95. S.D. Meyers v. Canada, Partial Award (Nov. 13, 2000), available at http://
www.appletonlaw.com/cases/Meyers%20-%20Merits%20Award.pdf (last visited Jan.
17, 2005).
96. Id. 126
97. S.D. Meyers v. Canada, Statement of Claim,
13, 14 (Oct. 30, 1998),
available at http://www.appletonlaw/cases/mclaim.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
98. Partial Award, supra note 95, 112.
99. Id.
100. Id. 144.
101. Id. 142.
102. Id. 288.
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record reveals. 10 3 In the tribunal's opinion, an expropriation usually
to make use of his°4
involves a lasting removal of the ability of the owner
situation.
Myers'
in
happen
not
or her economic rights, which did
They observed "tantamount" in Article 1110 means "equivalent." The
tribunal stated that in deciding whether conduct tantamount to expropriation
has occurred, they must look at the real interests, purpose, and effect of
10 5 The tribunal was in agreement with the
the government measure.
decision in Pope and Talbot that the phrase "tantamount to expropriation"
expropriation and is not an expanded version of the
refers to 0indirect
6
concept.1
The Myers decision is an excellent attempt by the tribunal to make a
clear distinction between an act of expropriation and regulation. It laid
down three points of distinction between the two in the course of its
decision that are summarized in the Table below:
EXPROPRIATION

REGULATION

the deprivation of ownership
1. Involves
10 7
rights.

1. Involves a 'lesser'
08
interference.'

2. With some exceptions, it usually
amounts to a lasting removal of the
owner's ability to utilize her economic

2. Not necessarily a lasting
11
deprivation. °

rights.

109

3. Connotes some exercise of defacto or
dejure power amounting to a 'taking' by
a government authority with a view to
transferring ownership-these are
undoubtedly covered by Article 1110.11

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

284.
283.
285.
286.
282.
283.
280.
281.

3. Regulatory conduct by a public
authority is unlikely to be subject of
but the
complaint under Article 1110,
2
possibility is not ruled out."

These are important distinctions-ones that claimants often have
chosen to ignore in filing Chapter 11 claims. While it is often not easy
to apply the distinctions in a given factual situation, it is encouraging for
the public to note that the tribunals charged with the question have not
lost sight of it and make every attempt to maintain a balance between
investors' rights and the sovereignty of the NAFTA Parties.
4. Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico'

13

Metalclad represents the first Chapter 11 case in which a final award
was rendered with a positive finding of expropriation by the NAFTA
Party respondent, Mexico. 14 The case involved a concession contract
that was awarded to the claimant by the Mexican government for the
construction and operation of a hazardous waste landfill.'15 Federal and
state officials gave the claimant the necessary permit to construct the
landfill. 16 Upon completion of the project, however, allegations were
made that the construction had been undertaken without the necessary
municipal permit. 17 The claimant was not informed of the meeting of
municipal officials in which its application for the permit had been
considered and denied and thus was not given an opportunity to make its
case. 1 18 Further, the Governor of that Mexican state issued an
Ecological Decree, the effect of which was to permanently preclude the
claimant from operating the landfill." 9
The Tribunal held that the municipality had acted in excess of its
authority, as its role was only to administer the construction permit
issued by the federal and state government. 2 ° In a very short passage,
the tribunal concluded that by acquiescing to the illegal conduct of the
municipality that resulted in the deprivation of the right of the claimant
to operate its landfill, Mexico's conduct was tantamount to expropriation.
The Tribunal stated that it need not decide the motivation or intent of the
adoption of the environmental measure in question.' 2' The Tribunal
went on to state:
113. Final Award rendered on August 30, 2000, available at http://www.
naftaclaims.com (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
114. For a full discussion of the factual background of the Metalclad case, see
Marisa Yee, The Future of Environmental Regulation after Article 1110 of NAFTA: A
Look at the Methanex and Metalclad Cases, 9 HASTrNGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y
85, 98 (2002).
115. Supra note 113, at 28.
116. Id. 29.
117. Id. 51.
118. Id. 54.
119. Id. 59.
120. Id. 106.
121. Id. 103.
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[E]xpropriation under NAFTA includes not only takings of property, such as
outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in favor of the host
State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which
has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use
of reasonable to-be-expected economic benefit122of property even if not
necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.

It thus espoused an effects-based rather than intent-based analysis of
the host state's action. The same effects-based analysis was applied by
123 Not
the Tribunal in its final award in the Pope and Talbot matter.
surprisingly, this case evoked public outcry by environmentalists and
NAFTA commentators. 124 Such a broad test for indirect expropriation
would sweep within its scope several governmental measures that are
regulatory in nature. This approach conflicts with the conception of a
police powers exception. 125 The Metalclad award thus supports the
important
position of NAFTA critics that arbitration panels do not weigh them.
126
before
public policy concerns that are implicated by the matter
Mexico appealed the Metalclad award to the British Columbia
127 The finding of the
Supreme Court and sought an order to set it aside.
tribunal that Mexico's actions prior to the issuance of the Ecological
128
Decree constituted a violation of Article 1110 was set aside, although
129
The decision
the award itself was upheld on jurisdictional grounds.
was welcomed in several quarters despite what some have characterized
as a cautious stance by 30the British Columbia Supreme Court on the
scope of judicial review.'

122. Id. 103.
123. Final Merits Award, rendered on April 10, 2001 (redacted version available at
www.naftaclaims.com).
124. Olasolo, supra note 19, at 190. For a critical discussion of the Metalclad
award, see Yee, supra note 114, at 105-06.
125. Mann, supra note 72, at 578-79.
126. Yee, supra note 114, at 105.
127. Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings
by the Secretariat of the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes,
ICSID Doc. 11 (June 1979), available at http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/facility/partAarticle.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2005). The ICSID Additional Facility Rules governing
the arbitration provide that the applicable law for review of the award is the jurisdiction
in which it is made. Id.
128. Metalclad,89 B.C.L.R.3d 359, 381-82 (2001).
129. Id. at 386.
130. For a full discussion of the nature and implications of the decision of the
British Columbia Supreme Court, see Chris Tollefson, Metalclad v. United Mexican States
Revisited: Judicial Oversight of NAFTA 's Chapter11 Investor-State Claim Process, 11
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 183, 191-226 (2002). For Metalclad's reaction to the outcome,
see US Firm Sees NAFTA Case Win as Hollow Victory, GLOBE AND MAIL, May 5, 2001, at B3.

The approach of tribunals was, however, more conservative in later
cases, such as Feldman v. Mexico.
3
5. Feldman v. Mexico1 '

In this case, the tribunal rejected the investor's claim that Mexico's
decision not to provide rebate for significant amounts of export tax paid
for the export of cigarettes from Mexico constituted '[creeping]
132
expropriation' of its business.
The tribunal observed that while in some cases regulation can amount
to indirect expropriation in violation of Article 1110, it was not the case
in this instance. 33 It cautioned that not every business problem
experienced by an investor can amount to an Article 1110 violation.1 34
While it conceded that the investor had experienced some difficulty with
the tax authorities, it stated that tax authorities in most countries do not
act consistently or predictably and such a general tax measure did not
amount to an expropriatory act. 135 In the words of the tribunal: "[N]ot
all government regulatory activity that makes it difficult or impossible
for an investor to carry out a particular business, change in the law or
change in the application of existing laws that makes it uneconomical, to
continue a particular business, is an expropriation under Article 1110.11136
The language used in this tribunal's award thus allows some room for
host governments to carry out legitimate governmental regulation; in
particular, the exercise of the general taxing power without the threat of
a claim of indirect expropriation. While the outcome is to be expected
given the clear regulatory nature of the impugned governmental action,
it must be lauded because it indicates that Metalclad was an anomalous
result. Indeed, the tribunal agreed with the opinion of the British Columbia
Supreme Court that later reviewed the much-criticized Metalclad
award. 137
At one level, the course adopted by the Feldman tribunal would appear
appropriate; after all, arbitrators are appointed to resolve the narrow
question raised by the investment dispute. On the other hand, is it
desirable to have an ad hoc international tribunal decide matters without
regard to public policy, or should such a tribunal be vested with the
authority to decide the matter in the first place? This question is a
131. Feldman v. Mexico, ICSID, Case No. ARB(AF)99/1, award of Dec. 16, 2002,
availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/16639.pdf.
132. Id. ll0.
133. Id. 111.
134. Id.
135. Id. 112.
136. Id.
137. Id. 133.
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normative one and presents a problem that is quite distinct from that of
textual indeterminacy. Arguably, the problem stemming from the sparse
text in NAFTA defining the scope of "tantamount to expropriation" has
been resolved like most questions that are fact-dependent-by a
thorough analysis of the facts involved in each matter brought before an
arbitral tribunal. As an empirical matter, and as the cases reviewed in
this Part appear to suggest, arbitral tribunals have achieved a surprising
degree of consistency in their decision-making. This does not answer the
legitimacy-based objections, however, and the latter are addressed in the
next part.
III. LEGITIMACY-BASED OBJECTIONS TO NAFTA's INVESTMENT
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM

The legitimacy problem faced by the NAFTA regime is multi-faceted
and by no means unique to NAFTA. 138 One aspect of the problem is the
notion of a private party's right of action against the host government,
which though an integral part of the investment dispute resolution
process, is perhaps139not a desirable method by which these disputes
should be resolved.

A second related concern is that the host state's vulnerability to such
arbitration is an infringement of its sovereignty. 140 This concern is
somewhat countered by recent cases involving host states resorting to
municipal courts as a de facto appellate authority and seeking to expand
their scope of review.14 ' This latter trend presents the separate problem
over international
of domestic courts' authority to exercise appellate review
42
arbitrations in which foreign states are disputants.1
138. Similar questions plague the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement
mechanism. For more on this issue, see generally, Joel P. Trachtman & Philip M.
Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Private PartyParticipationin WTO Dispute Settlement:
Whose Right is it Anyway?, 44 HARV. INT'L L. J 221, 227-28 (2003); see also Friedman
& Verhoosel, supra note 70.
139. Trachtman and Moreman, supra note 138, at 249. The authors propose a costbenefit approach suggesting that before "transferring rights back from states to
individuals, we should investigate the benefits that might flow from each institutional
structure, as well as the costs, including transaction costs." Id.
140. See discussion III.B below.
141. Brower, supra note 16, at 73.
142. Indeed, investors would argue that this form of municipal judicial review is
even more pernicious than the perceived lack of accountability of the arbitral tribunal.
As Brower states:

Even assuming that the notion of private party participation is sound,
and no viable objections can be made relating to incursion of state
sovereignty, there still remains the problem of whether arbitration behind
closed doors before a panel of arbitrators is the desirable approach to
resolve such disputes, or whether the process needs to be democratized
to some extent to allow for voices other than those of the corporate
investor and the host state. All of these questions are explored below.
A. PrivatePartyActions againstHost States
The debate of whether private parties ought to be able to commence
arbitration proceedings against a host state is not new. 143 As mentioned
earlier, NAFTA is not the only investment treaty that allows for
arbitration between a private investor and the host nation.' 44 Such
provisions are commonplace in bilateral investment treaties and are
frequently used by investors. 145 To state that NAFTA is novel in this
regard is misleading; in the thirty years preceding NAFTA, bilateral
146
investment treaties had begun to grant direct investor standing.
Indeed, the United States was a party to many of those treaties and at
least theoretically was subject to arbitral claims by foreign investors in
the United States. 147
Before attacking the notion of private party standing in international
investment arbitration, it is important to keep in mind its historical
Requiring national courts of NAFTA parties themselves to balance
those states' politically charged legislative, judicial, and regulatory
interests against alien investors' substantive and procedural rights
under NAFTA is an open invitation to controversy, potentially even
manipulation.
Charles N. Brower, NAFTA 's Investment Chapter Dynamic Laboratory,FailedExperiments
and Lessonsfor the FTAA, 97 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PRoc. 251, 254 (2003).
143. For a brief discussion of the pros and cons of private party direct access in
international dispute mechanisms, see Jessica S. Wiltse, Comment, An Investor-State
Dispute Mechanism in the Free Trade Area of the Americas: Lessons from NAFTA
Chapter 11, 51 BuFF. L. REv., 1145, 1168-72 (2003).
144. For an informative discussion on bilateral investment treaties and arbitration
provisions, see Aron Broches, Bilateral'Investment Protection Treaties and Arbitration
of Investment Disputes, in THE ART OF ARBITRATION 63 (J. Schultsz & J. van den Berg,
eds., 1982).
145. Moshe Hirsh points to the trend of expanding activities of modern states in
international economics and the resulting proliferation of bilateral treaties to deal with
investment disputes with foreign investors that provide for arbitration as the preferred
mode of dispute settlement. MOSHE HIRSH, THE ARBITRATION MECHANISM OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES 10 (1993).
146. Coe, infra note 150170, at 1414. More than ever, in recent times, bilateral
investment treaties have been on the rise. For a brief background on bilateral investment
treaties, see Friedman and Verhoosel, supra note 70.
147. Id. As a factual matter, however, the host nations against whom foreign
investors made claims were developing countries and not the United States.
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genesis as a reaction to the inadequacy of existing dispute resolution
structures in the context of international investment disputes.1 48 Prior to
the advent of bilateral investment treaties, investors from developed
nations often faced problems of expropriation without compensation by
149
Resort to the
host states pursuing a protectionist economic policy.

national courts of the very same government that was infringing the
investor's property interests often proved ineffective and deprived the
foreign investor of a neutral forum. Nor was it feasible to resort to the
investor's home state in light of doctrines that foreign sovereign
immunity and separation of powers protected the host state from being
prosecuted in the domestic court of another state.' 50 The doctrine of
diplomatic protection, which is the traditional manner in which private
rights of nationals are vindicated by home states at the state to state
level, proved too inefficient and provided far too much discretion to the
state of nationality in pursuing the claims of their nationals.' 5 ,
The point is that private party standing in investment disputes is the
result of evolution from the lack of existing feasible alternatives. Private
party participation is a process that forms the core of the NAFTA
Investment Chapter. 152 Despite its problems, it is likely to remain on the
books until there is consensus on a better, more neutral alternative to
against expropriation (of the
arbitration whereby private investors' rights
1 53
vindicated.
be
may
kind)
indirect
direct or
148. For historical background, see Wiltse, supra note 143, at 1147, 1148.
149. In fact, the United States was the chief proponent of arbitration as a means to
resolve investment dispute, in view of protectionist doctrines like the Calvo Doctrine in
Mexico. For more discussion, see Alvarez and Park, supra note 15, at 367-69. See also
Sandrino, supra note 13.

150. Jack Coe, Taking Stock of NAFTA Chapter 11 in its Tenth Year: An Interim
Sketch of Selected Themes, Issues and Methods, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1381, 1416
(2003).
151. Id.
152. This is especially so because NAFTA specifically forecloses resort to private
lawsuits. Article 2021 states: "No Party may provide for a right of action under its
domestic law against any other Party on the ground that a measure of another Party is
inconsistent with this Agreement."
153. HIRSH, supra note 145, at 9. One reason for arbitration with foreign investors
as the preferred mechanism is explained by Hirsh as follows:
Arbitration is held in private, and it is obviously preferable for the resolution of
conflicts which the parties would rather not publicize. This is particularly
relevant to disagreements relating to commercial secrets (patents, the financial
situation of a firm, etc.), sensitive political subjects (especially when a state is
involved in a dispute).

Id.

B. Arbitral Tribunals versus National Courts-Threatto
NationalSovereignty?
The arbitration of investment disputes often requires the panel to rule
on the validity of the host state's actions.' 5 4 The actions in maniy cases
are those of state and local governments.1 55 This not-uncommon
scenario raises concerns about state sovereignty. 1'6 Some scholars argue
that states should be free from interference and from the fear of an
adverse arbitration outcome in order to effectively deploy its police
powers to protect the health and safety of its citizens. 57
One response to this position is that when the Parties negotiated
NAFTA, they were well aware of this and yet ceded their sovereignty to
a limited extent. 58 On the other hand, did the Parties really envisage the
barrage of investor claims that Article 1 110 has invited? Probably not;
however, if sovereignty were a true concern for the NAFTA Parties,
there would have been some initiative to amend NAFTA's provisions.
While there have been rumblings in the past, 5 9 no clear initiative has
emerged, suggesting that perhaps the perceived threat to sovereignty is
illusory or so marginal that as a practical matter states choose to condone
such incursions in light of other more compelling policy considerations,
including the safeguarding of investors' rights and assuring a neutral
forum for their vindication. In any event, NAFTA tribunals have expressed
restraint and deference to national courts of the host nation in their
60
awards, refusing to acknowledge any appellate authority over them.1
Leaving aside the consent argument described above, however, there
may be some validity to the concern that important questions of
domestic public policy and state liability to foreign investors should not
be left to ad hoc arbitral panels that unlike domestic courts are
unaccountable.' 6 1 The objection takes either of two forms: 1) that
154. Donald S. MacDonald, Chapter 11 of NAFTA: What are the Implicationsfor
Sovereignty?, 24 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 281, 287 (1998).
155. For a brief but informative discussion of some recent NAFTA awards' impact
on state and local sovereignty, see William T. Warren, NAFTA and State Sovereignty: A
Pandora'sBox of Property Rights, SPECTRUM: J. OF STATE Gov'T. 21 (Spring 2002).
156. Id.
157. See, e.g., Samrat Ganguly, The Investor-State DisputeMechanism (IDSM) and
a Sovereign's Power to Protect Public Health, 38 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L & COMP. L.
REv. 113, 125 (1999).
158. Celine Levesque, Investor-State Arbitration Under NAFTA Chapter 11: What
Lies Beneath JurisdictionalChallenge, 17 ICSID REv. FOREIGN INVESTMENt L.J. 320
(2002).
159. MacDonald, supra note 154, at 282.
160. Coe, supra note 150, at 1401.
161. The concern about the increasingly limited role of courts is not confined to
NAFTA alone-it is a manifestation of a more general fear in the United States. Martin
L. Haines, Who Needs the Courts? Many People are Worried that Courts are being
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adjudication of investment disputes should not be left to supra-national
entities of any kind, or 2) that it should not be delegated to ad hoc
arbitration. In its first form, the objection is very broad, and despite its
normative plausibility, will likely be untenable as a practical matter,
given the historical failure of leaving the resolution of investment
disputes to domestic courts. 16 2 In its second form, however, the objection
could be substantially addressed by creating a permanent judicial
tribunal at the regional level among NAFTA Parties to resolve
investment disputes. 163 While no easy task, it is certainly conceivable." 6
In the absence of any other mechanism to address the sovereignty
concern, one approach has been judicial review of the arbitral award by
domestic courts. The precedent of the Metalclad case and judicial
review of the award by the Canadian court was the first of its kind in the
NAFTA context. 16 1 While resort to national courts is seen by some as
the more sound approach, 166 this scenario is alarming because it
undermines the integrity of the arbitral process of settling investor-state
disputes that the NAFTA Parties have agreed upon. Furthermore, the
use of national courts is problematic for two other reasons. First, if an
Displaced as Our Primary Dispute Resolvers, 164 NAT'L L. J. 311 (2001), stating:
"Many Americans are worried that courts are being displaced as our primary dispute
resolvers by arbitration, mediation and other less-formal procedures--ones less likely to
be concerned with accountability and fairness."
162. See discussion in the previous section.
163. Wiltse suggests that the creation of a standing body in place of ad hoc tribunals
that decide NAFTA investment disputes "to interpret and apply NAFTA law, and hear
appeals from various dispute settlement mechanisms, including Chapter 11, would
provide consistency and stability to the NAFTA dispute process." Wiltse, supra note
143, at 1190.
164. Coe suggests various forms that a standing appellate body could take,
including a Chamber of the International Court of Justice established for the specific
purpose of reviewing investment awards. He also states that arguments in support of
such a body might suggest replacement of non-permanent arbitral panels altogether. At
the same time, he points out that it would eliminate the parties' power to select
arbitrators for the dispute in question, which is seen as an element of legitimacy in the
current regime. Coe, supra note 150, at 1451, 1452. Nonetheless, it is a plausible idea
to create a permanent judicial body. Indeed, that might be the mechanism in place in the
future.
165. Yee, supra note 114, at 105. In its appeal to the Canadian court, Mexico
argued for a more searching judicial review in the NAFTA investment dispute context
than is usually the case in private commercial arbitration, as the investor seeks to enforce
a treaty obligation rather than the terms of a commercial agreement. For more
discussion on this argument, see Tollefson, supra note 130, at 203.
166. Afilalo suggests that the solution to problems of transparency and legitimacy
seen in the context of NAFTA tribunals is best resolved by having the Parties' national
courts decide Chapter 11 disputes. Afilalo, supra note 16, at 52.

investor must resort to the national court of the state against which it
asserts a claim of indirect expropriation, it would be deprived, at least
theoretically, of a neutral forum-a problem that gave rise to the
arbitration alternative in the first place.' 6 7 Second, even if the investor
could bring the dispute before a national court of a Party other than the
one against whom the claim is asserted, it would present the even more
troubling problem of one sovereign nation adjudicating 1the
68 rights of
another-a notion that flies in the face of international law.
Chapter 11 does not contain a provision that directly addresses the
question of whether there can be judicial review of an arbitral award by
a domestic court, and if so, to what extent. Article 1136169 hints at the
possibility of judicial review by a national court, but does not specify
whether judicial review by the national court of any NAFTA Party is
permissible, or is limited to the national court of the NAFTA Party to the
investment dispute, or for that matter the national court of the place
where the arbitration is held. Article 1136 does however reference the
arbitral rules that the parties to a dispute have chosen to govern their
arbitration.170 The ICSID Convention provides facilities for arbitration
of foreign investment disputes only between member states and nationals
of other member states.'
Given that neither Mexico nor Canada are
172
parties to the ICSID Convention, the grounds of review contained in it
167. Indeed, the possibility of a neutral forum is what spurred investor-state
arbitration in the first place. HIRSH, supra note 145, at 10-12.
168. The Metalclad case at least facially does not raise these particular concerns
because it was Mexico that sought to set aside the award in a Canadian court. They are
however clear corollaries and could well characterize judicial review of some future
NAFTA award.
169. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1136 (2) refers to the "applicable review
procedure for an interim award." Art. 1136 (3) states:
A disputing party may not seek enforcement of a final award until: (a) in the
case of a final award made under the ICSID Convention (i) 120 days have
elapsed from the date the award was rendered and no disputing party has
requested revision or annulment of the award, or (ii) revision or annulment
proceedings have been completed; and (b) in the case of a final award under
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules (i) three months have elapsed from the
date the award was rendered and no disputing party has commenced a
proceeding to revise, set aside or annul the award, or (ii) a court has dismissed
or allowed an application to revise, set aside or annul the award and there is no
further appeal.
170. The problem is apparent from the face of art. 1136. NAFTA, supra note 1, at
art. 1136; see also Olosalo, supranote 19, at 200, 201.
171. The ICSID Convention, supra note 5, at art. 1.
172. The ICSID Convention, supra note 5, at art. 52. It provides for an internal
review procedure through an ad hoc committee. Id. Rule 50(3) states the grounds for
such review: the tribunal was not properly constituted; the tribunal has manifestly
exceeded its powers; serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure; failure to
state the reasons for an award; and corruption on the part of a tribunal member. Even if
these grounds were somehow relevant to a NAFTA arbitral proceeding, they are very
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remain irrelevant. That leaves the UNCITRAL Rules 173 and the ICSID
(Additional Facility) Rules 17 4 -neither of which contain provisions that
address the proper scope of judicial review175by national courts; nor do
they lay down specific annulment standards.
This lack of clarity in the arbitral rules suggests that while judicial
review of NAFTA awards in investment disputes was envisaged by the
NAFTA Parties, the scope, extent, and even the question of which
national court may conduct judicial review remains uncertain and largely
hinges on tactics employed by investors in seeking judicial review, as
well as the national courts' approach to reviewing such awards, whether
deferential or more searching in nature. This is bound to lead to
inconsistent results stemming from the diverse judicial approaches of
each NAFTA Party. It also presents the possibility of derailing the
arbitral process, which is premised on efficiency and faith in the finality
of awards. At the very least, one may conclude from this discussion that
unfettered judicial review of NAFTA awards is not an appropriate
antidote to the perceived institutional legitimacy problem that plagues
NAFTA tribunals.
C. Transparencyand the relatedQuestion of Democratization
The need for transparency of arbitration proceedings has often been
expressed in the NAFTA Chapter 11 context while addressing legitimacy
concerns. 176 The provisions of Chapter 11 do not by themselves provide
the public the right to receive copies of pleadings, evidence, or other
written arguments. 177 Nor do they confer a right on the public to
narrow grounds for review and do not contemplate review of factual or legal findings of
the tribunal.
173. Arbitration Rules, supra note 12.
174.
175.

Additional Facility Rules, supra note 11.
Alvarez and Park, supra note 15, at 374, 375 (explains that whether arbitration

is conducted under UNCITRAL or the Additional Facility Rules, the arbitration will
proceed under either the New York Convention or the Panama Convention-and since
neither provides grounds for annulment, NAFTA awards are consequently subject to the
rules of judicial review prevailing at the place of arbitration. If this analysis is accurate,
it is baffling and indeed troubling that the Investment Chapter would (intentionally or
otherwise) leave the important question of the scope of judicial review of an arbitral
award subject to such uncertainty).
176. See e.g., Soloway, supra note 59, at 10 (stating: "[The] lack of transparency
seems to run counter to 'the values and views' integral to the post-war trading system
and indeed democratic principles, where transparency of legal process is a fundamental
norm").

177.

This follows as a matter of negative implication from the provisions that

participate in the proceedings. 78 This appears problematic, because the
parties to the investment dispute are often litigating matters that are of
core public concern, while non-party stakeholders are precluded from
participation. 179 As a practical matter, most of the tribunals' awards have
been made publicly available. This is, however, more a result of consent
to publication by the parties to disputes and therefore leaves the
normative problem unchanged.
In modem legal systems, transparency is seen as a central fairness
value and often taken for granted, or at the very least, is largely undisputed. 80
Commercial arbitration on the other hand has been conventionally a
closed-door proceeding, with confidentiality being the paramount value
8
and often a precondition for parties agreeing to submit to arbitration.1 '
The problem has been to identify the place of investment disputes in this
context-is there a spectrum of transparency, and if so, which model of
dispute resolution does it more closely approximate? The stake of the
private investor in a confidential resolution of the dispute is often
considerable; 182 however, the involvement of the public's interest, particularly
environmental interests, is inescapable and deserves vindication through
a process that allows for183voices of stakeholders, other than the parties to
the dispute, to be heard.

In response to demands for transparency and the need to democratize
the arbitration process from several quarters,

84

two of the arbitral panels

accepted amicus curiae briefs.18 5 A few months ago, the Free Trade

explicitly grant the other non-disputing NAFTA Parties a right of access to such
documents. See NAFTA, supra note 1, at arts. 1127-29.
178. Id.
179. Chris Tollefson, Games without Frontiers: Investor Claims and Citizen
Submissions under the NAFTA Regime, 27 YALE J. INT'L L. 141, 151-52 (2002).
180. Michael D. Goldhaber, Arbitration Scorecard:PrivatePractices,25 AM. LAW.
S. 16 (2003).
181. Id.
182. Indeed, the aspect of confidentiality is the chief attraction of arbitration.
HIRSH, supra note 145. Coe points out that the extent of transparency that is to be
expected in NAFTA proceedings should be relative to its counterparts in international
commercial arbitration, and that in fact, to the latter, "[NAFTA] Chapter 11 proceedings
may be discomforting in their openness." Coe, supra note 150, at 1434. While this
argument is facially tenable, it ignores the crucial difference between conventional
international commercial arbitration and investor-state disputes-that the latter do not
involve purely commercial questions that do not implicate state policy or public interest.
183. Interestingly, NAFTA Parties that are not party to a particular Chapter I1
proceeding are entitled to make submissions on interpretive questions. NAFTA, supra
note 1, at art. 1128. For further discussion, see Coe, supra note 150, at 1409.
184. Tollefson, supra note 179, at 185.
185. See United Parcel Serv. Of Am. v. Canada, Decision of the Tribunal on
Petitions for Intervention and Participation as Amici Curiae
61-62 (Oct. 17, 2001),
availableat http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/documents/IntVent oct.pdf; Methanex
Corp. v. United States, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons to
Intervene as "Amici Curiae," T 31 (Jan. 15, 2001), availableat http://www.international-
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Commission issued a statement supporting the participation of nondisputing parties in arbitration proceedings. 18 6 In addition, the United
States has issued a statement that it will support open hearings in
arbitration proceedings under Chapter 11 and will attempt to obtain the
a welcome step
consent of the investor party as well. 187 These represent
88
towards democratization of the arbitration process.'

IV. NEW DIRECTION FOR NAFTA's CHAPTER 11: RENEGOTIATION OR
FRESH INTERPRETIVE METHODOLOGY?

With this background and analysis of NAFTA's legitimacy problem,
there remains little doubt that there needs to be some change in status
quo. That change can be achieved in one of two ways, or perhaps a
combination of the two, depending on the political will of the Parties and
the extent to which they perceive the legitimacy problem: renegotiate
NAFTA provisions or change the existing approach to NAFTA
interpretation by tribunals. The discussion that follows considers these
alternatives, both in the limited context of Article 11 10 and the NAFTA
Investment Chapter in general.
A. Is there a Need to Re-Negotiate the
Investment Provisionsof NAFTA?
i. Re-crafting Article 1110
The question that remains is whether the relative ambiguity in Article
1110 and the unpredictability of future outcomes are sufficient to
warrant re-negotiation of Chapter 11 by the Parties. Some authors have
econonic-law.org/Methanex/Methanex%20-%20Amicus%2ODecision.pdf.
186. Statement of the Free Trade Commission on non-disputing party participation
(Oct. 7, 2003), available at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/whemisphere/nafta2003/ statementnon-disputingparties.pdf. The role of the Free Trade Commission and its relationship to
NAFTA tribunals presents a separate set of legitimacy questions, addressed in Stefan

Matiation, Arbitration with Two Twists: Loewen v. United States and Free Trade
Commission Intervention in NAFTA Chapter.11 Disputes, 24 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L.
451 (2003).

187. Statement on Open Hearings in NAFTA Chapter 11 Arbitrations (Oct.7, 2003), at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade-Agreements/RegionaUNAFTA/asset-upload-file212
_3601.pdf.

188. Brower urges that "[I]n light of the manifestly important public policy
considerations at stake in NAFTA cases, NAFTA tribunals should continue to encourage
the parties to make pleadings publicly available, permit amicus curi interventions, and
limit confidential filings and redactions." Brower, supra note 142, at 252.

427

expressed skepticism over whether any international regime should
compensate indirect expropriation, given its definitional ambiguity and
scope for expansive interpretation.' 8 9 The view propounded here is that
the concept of indirect expropriation in international law is fluid by
definition. It is the non-obviousness of both the intent and the effect of
the government action in these that warrants the use of the adjective
"tantamount," or else it would have fallen under the clear category of
direct expropriation. Fluidity of definition alone, however, should not
suffice to preclude compensation. Ease of interpretation per se is
seldom the touchstone for compensability in other areas of the law and
expropriation should be no different.
Apart from some basic guiding principles, whether or not there has
been a compensable act of indirect expropriation will in every case have
to be a fact-based inquiry, which can only be undertaken by a tribunal.' 90
No amount of negotiation by the Parties can result in an exhaustive list
of "compensable takings."'' On the other hand, greater specificity than
the current provision is desirable. Perhaps a qualifying paragraph should
be inserted in Article 1110 stating that the phrase "tantamount to
expropriation" does not refer to every case of government regulation
and that certain types of regulation are specifically exempt from
arbitration. 92 This would make explicit what the tribunals have found
as being implicit in the Chapter's provisions and thereby put to rest all
interpretive doubts.
ii. Uniform Standardfor JudicialReview of Chapter 11 Awards
If judicial review of arbitral awards is a trend not likely to be reversed
in the near future,193 or if judicial review is found to be an essential
189. Been & Beauvais, supra note 31, at 141, 142. The authors' position is that the
definitional ambiguity of indirect expropriation is "notoriously susceptible to expansive
interpretation and threatens to capture efficient nondiscriminatory land use and
environmental regulation." Id. As a result, they suggest that "the United States should
seek to limit treaty-based expropriation clauses to the traditional concerns of
international law: direct nationalization, physical invasion or seizure of property, and
'creeping expropriation' or 'constructive takings' involving transfer of control
of the
property to the government rather than mere diminution in the property's value." Id. at
142.
190. This view is also supported by COMEAUX & KINSELLA, supra note 35, at 15.
191. Soloway, supra note 59, at 11.
192. It is true that Chapter 11 specifically excludes certain governmental acts and
programs from being considered expropriatory, such as compulsory licensing, public
education, social welfare, and health. NAFTA, supra note 1, at art. 1101(4). However,
these are hardly controversial in that they fall within the traditional police powers of the
state. Other types of governmental regulation are less clear-environmental regulations,
for instance.
193. There have been at least two other instances of judicial review of arbitral
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check on the arbitration process, then it is imperative that NAFTA
Chapter 11 contain a provision imposing a clear standard for review of
arbitral awards by national courts that applies to all three NAFTA
Parties. Otherwise, Parties that may have a less deferential standard of
review may have an opportunity to review the validity of Chapter 11
awards more frequently and more searchingly than others. Providing for
a uniform degree of deference would provide a great deal of certainty as
well as legitimacy to the judicial review process, were it to take place.
iii. General Considerations
Overall, the textual indeterminacy question has been addressed by the
numerous NAFTA disputes that have resulted in awards over the years,
and any residual ambiguity can be resolved in the manner just described.
The real question is whether such interpretation should be left to
arbitrators rather than to some judicial or seemingly more legitimate
This may require a fundamental reconsideration of
mechanism.
arbitration as the preferred mode of dispute resolution in the context of
investment disputes. A less drastic approach would call for the NAFTA
Parties to create a permanent supranational judicial body to resolve
investment disputes. This body could be composed of retired judges
from the domestic courts of the Parties, as well as renowned arbitration
experts that currently play the role of arbitrators in NAFTA ad hoc
tribunals. The legitimacy of the judicial body can be established and
preserved by rules providing for mandatory publication of its decisions.
The rules should provide for some form of summary procedure, although
not as detailed or intricate as domestic court procedure-this would meet
NAFTA's goal of efficient dispute resolution while leaving little room
awards apart from the Metalclad case discussed in Part III B of this Comment. See
generally, Rajeev Sharma, Adam Goodman, Ontario Court of Appeal Upholds NAFTA
Chapter 11 Award, ASIL Insight February 2005, at http://www.asil.org/insights/2005/02/
insight040214.html#_ednref' (last visited Apr. 19, 2005). In all three, Canadian courts
were reviewing the NAFTA Chapter 11 award. In two of the cases, Mexico was the
appellant. While sovereignty issues are not as salient when the moving party is another
sovereignty (and hence submits to the jurisdiction of the other sovereign)--these cases
could spell the beginning a more pronounced trend of investors attacking awards in the
national courts of a NAFTA Party that is not the host state. Another problem is
inconsistency in formulating and applying an appropriate standard of review even within
a single state. See Alan Meck, The Standard of Review of Chapter I1 Arbitrations:
Deference, at http://www.alanmacek.com/egal/Chapterl 1 StandardOfReview.pdf (last visited
Apr. 19, 2005), suggesting the stark difference in the approach of Canadian courts in
Metalclad and Feldman (Karpa).

for arbitrary decision-making. Some authors have suggested introducing
provisions that would make decisions by the judicial body binding.' 4
While curing consistency problems at a normative level, it will probably
leave the dispute resolution process in a state of inflexibility that will
undermine effective decision-making. In the end, the quest of NAFTA
negotiators should be to find a happy medium between ad hoc
arbitration as it exists today and a rigid permanent judicial institution
that is constrained not only by transparency and procedure but also
precedent.
B. Suggestionsfor InterpretiveMethodology
Given the limited usefulness and perhaps feasibility of renegotiation
by the Parties, arbitral tribunals should undertake a deeper investigation
and application of international legal principles before arriving at
decisions. 195 In doing so, the tribunals should refine their interpretive
methodology. There has already been a steady trend of arbitral awards
resembling well-reasoned judicial opinions. 196 That approach provides
the arbitral tribunal with an aura of legitimacy that only improves with
increasingly effective transparency measures. Even without the formal
constraint of precedent, the fact that arbitral tribunals borrow reasoning
and language from prior awards lends some measure of logical
consistency to the decision-making process. Another suggestion has
been for arbitral tribunals to take a restrictive view of their competence
as one way to avoid deciding issues that directly affect the public interest
of the host state. 97 While that may be possible in some cases, the
bifurcation of issues or wholesale rejection of the entire claim on public
policy may be more difficult in others. Also, the question is how those
issues of public interest are to be eventually decided' 98-should they be
194. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
195. Ari Afilalo suggests:
An explicit articulation of the applicable norms would.., resolve the
legitimacy concerns inherent in a potential conflict between sensitive domestic
norms and international standards that is adjudicated under ambiguous
language, confine Chapter 11 to its proper place in the world of international
trade an investment in light of the object and purpose of the treaty, and further
the international common law enterprise.
Ari Afilalo, Meaning, Ambiguity and Legitimacy: Judicial (Re-)Constructionof NAFTA
Chapter11, 25 Nw. J. INT'LL. & Bus. 279, 310 (2005).
196. Afilalo points to recent tribunal awards that suggest the trend towards reasoned
elaboration is the developing norm in decision-making. Id. at 313, 314.
197. Id.
198. In the domestic context, courts are able to duck questions that are heavily laden
with public policy implication through doctrines like separation of powers and political
question. The difference, however, is that it is (at least in theory) possible to resolve
those questions through the political process, i.e., elections. No such alternative exists
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left to courts of the host state despite its clear conflict of interest with the
foreign investor? That may perhaps lead to a resurgence of protectionist
measures that NAFTA and other investment treaties sought to end.
i. Interpretationof Article 1110
A proper interpretation of the phrase "tantamount to expropriation" in
Article 1110 should take into account the rules laid down in the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 199 Section 3 of Part III of the Vienna
Convention contains provisions on the interpretation of multilateral
treaties. In particular, Article 31 states that a treaty should be interpreted
in good faith and that its terms should be given their ordinary meaning in
20 ° Such context
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
encompasses (in addition to the other terms of the treaty) any agreement
relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in
connection with the conclusion of the treaty.20 1
Based on Article 31, due importance ought to be given to other provisions
in NAFTA. Article 1114, for instance, is a provision within the Investment
Chapter that deals with environmental measures. Article 1114(1) provides
that "[n]othing in Chapter 11 shall be construed to prevent a party from
adopting any environmental measure otherwise consistent with that
chapter." It thus provides a specific exemption in relation to environmental
regulation that becomes especially significant, in light of the fact that
most of the impugned government measures so far have been
environmental measures. Placed in Part A of Chapter 11, it is no less
important a substantive provision than Article 1110, and interpretation of
the latter must be tempered by the former. Some scholars have criticized
Article 1114 as being of limited value in protecting environmental
regulation from being labeled as expropriation. One author is of the
opinion that the phrase "otherwise inconsistent" in Article 1114(1) acts
as a qualifier and limits its usefulness, in that an environmental measure
will not necessarily comply with Chapter 11 simply by virtue of being an
Others state that the provisions in Article
environmental measure.20z
for the foreign investor.
199. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969)
8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
200. Id.
201. Id. at art. 31(2).
202. Kevin Banks, NAFTA's Article 1110-Can Regulation be Expropriation?, 5
NAFTA: L. & Bus. REV. Am. 499, 511 (1999); see also Wiltse, supra note 143, at 1157.

1114 lack teeth because there is no enforcement mechanism to back it
and it offers no sanctions for non-compliance. 0 3 Much has been made
of the ambiguity in Article 1114(2) and20 4its reference to 'derogation' or
'relaxation' of environmental measures.
In spite of these valid criticisms of the weakness and ambiguity in
Article 1114, it can and ought to be used as a significant interpretive tool
by jurists and arbitrators. First, the criticism about the absence of an
enforcement mechanism is irrelevant when Article 1114 is used to aid in
the interpretation of other provisions. Second, Article 1114 is not a blanket
provision in that it leaves open the possibility that an environmental
measure may in fact be consistent with Chapter 11, in which case it is a
lawful non-compensable measure. The only way to ascertain if the
environmental measure falls under this category is if the tribunal in each
case examines it in the light of Article 1114. Third, the assessment of
whether there has been a "derogation" or "relaxation" of environmental
measures is a fact-based determination, and the tribunal faced with the
facts is in the best position to make this determination, rather than an ex
ante elaboration in the NAFTA text.
In addition, the Environmental Side Agreement 20 5 that was entered
into between the NAFTA Parties cannot be ignored or overridden when
interpreting Article 1110. This could be a powerful interpretive tool in
cases where the impugned government action is an environmental
measure.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It would be incorrect to dismiss the entire Chapter 11 investment dispute
settlement process as an assault on state sovereignty. The investor-state
mechanism is a valuable component of the NAFTA framework and one
that finds its place in other similar investment arrangements. Article
1110 in particular is an important part of this redressal mechanism. By
itself, it is an excellent safeguard against arbitrary actions taken by the
host state, as long as it is understood in its proper context using the
proper interpretive tools. Even in domestic law, a statute comes to life
203. Bruce Campbell, Moving in the Wrong Direction-The North American Free
Trade Agreement andEnvironmental Sustainability,available at http://www.ap. harvard.
edu/mainsite/papers/tne/campbel/Campbell.pdf
204. Daniel Esty & Damien Geradin, Market Access, Competitiveness and Harmonization:
EnvironmentalProtection in Regional TradeAgreements, at http://www.yale.edu/envirocenter/
publications/Esty-Geradin.Market.Access.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
205. North American Agreement for Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC). In its
Preamble, the NAAEC affirms the "importance of the environmental goals and objectives
of the NAFTA, including enhanced levels of environmental protection." Article 1 states
that those goals also form part of the objectives of the NAAEC.
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only after the judge infuses into it her opinion about its proper scope.
The same is true in the NAFTA dispute context, although of course in a
less structured fashion. The trend in the NAFTA investor-state dispute
resolution process is encouraging and greater clarity is being brought to
the provisions. As more cases end in final awards determined by
tribunals, the public and indeed the legal community will be less in the
dark about the scope of "tantamount to expropriation." In fact, the
textual indeterminacy question has presently receded to the background.
Transparency and participation of non-party stakeholders in the
arbitration process has also been achieved with some success. The
questions of private party access and the institutional legitimacy of
arbitral tribunals in addressing questions of public policy remain on the
table, however, along with newer questions relating to the wisdom and
propriety of judicial review of these arbitral awards. These are likely to
remain unanswered until a consensus can be reached about a feasible
and just alternative to arbitration as a mechanism to resolve investorstate disputes.
NAVEEN GURUDEVAN
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